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This paper models the effect of a HIV/AIDS epidemic on saving behavior and studies the 
welfare effects of testing for HIV. The model specifies a utility function that includes both 
regular consumption, and medical expenditures. Medical expenditures generate more utility if 
individuals are HIV infected, but they are only able to purchase the optimal medical 
consumption after being tested HIV positive. The paper describes different effects on 
aggregate savings according to different stages of the epidemic. We show that the HIV 
epidemic decreases savings if especially young individuals are (perceived to be) affected by the 
virus, but may increase savings if individuals perceive a sizable probability of getting infected 
later in life. By the same token, the welfare effects of testing young individuals differs greatly 
from the welfare effects of testing older individuals, the reason being that the savings 
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After its discovery in the late 1970s, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has rapidly developed to a 
widespread catastrophe in Sub-Saharan Africa. Over 25 million people died of AIDS related 
diseases and 38.6 million are living with HIV worldwide (UNAIDS, 2006). The pandemic 
especially increases mortality at a relatively young age. The highest risk of infection is between 
15-35 years old, where agents are most sexually active but also most productive (UNAIDS, 
2004). The incubation period of the HIV virus is about 7-10 years (Bonnel, 2000), which 
implies that once HIV infected, people face a long period of high expenses of specific food 
and medical treatment.  
 
In many respects, the disease is of economic interest in developing countries where extensive 
social-insurance systems are lacking. In an influential paper Young (2005) claims that the 
widespread infection, and its associated lower fertility, increases the scarcity of labor and, 
therefore, enhances future consumption possibilities. He assumed, however, a constant macro 
economic savings rate, implying that the stock of physical capital will not be affected in the 
long run. There are, however, many reasons to believe that societies adjust their savings 
pattern when a virus like HIV spreads. The increase in medical expenditures due to infection 
forces households to reduce and finally exhaust their savings or assets (see Steinberg et al., 
2002). In addition, savings for retirement are less necessary in societies where high mortality 
decreases the chances of getting old. As a counteracting force, however, savings may increase 
when the HIV epidemic spreads further. This occurs if individuals anticipate that in the future 
they may contract HIV and be confronted with high costs of medical treatment as a result. 
Kochar (2004) confirmed the existence of such an effect as he found that expectations of 
future illness increased overall savings in Pakistani households. However, these results do not 
tell much about the effect on aggregate savings, as perceptions of illness vary widely among 
individuals. 
 
Most empirical studies to date found a negative effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on savings. 
Ferreire et al. (2003) attributed this decline to a reduction in life expectancy. Bonnel (2000), 
who estimated the macroeconomic effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic using cross-country 
regressions, found that from 1990 to 1996 an increase in the HIV prevalence rate significantly 
reduced the change in the domestic saving rate in developing countries. However, he 
remarked that in a well-established epidemic savings could increase. In fact, recalculating his  
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model with data from a more recent period, i.e. 1997-2004, provides no significant results (see 
Annex 1). 
 
Besides, plotting actual HIV prevalence rates against net national savings of 2003 for a 
number of African countries suggests that the relationship between HIV/AIDS and savings 
indeed can be of a non-monotonic nature (see Figure 1). In particular, an increasing 
prevalence rate might first decrease the national savings rate, then lead to an upswing in 
savings, and finally to a downfall again. Actually, our theoretical model to be presented below, 
predicts exactly such an evolution of savings over the spread of the virus
4.  
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Source: World Development Indicators, 2006 
 
This paper employs a two-period lifetime optimization model to explain savings by a four-
stage process partly supporting Bonnel’s (2000) conjecture that savings are affected differently 
in the various stages of the epidemic. In the first stage that we distinguish, the disease is 
unknown. Some individuals die from the disease without knowing that AIDS killed them. 
These individuals are therefore not able to change saving behavior, so that aggregate savings 
are not affected. In the second stage of the epidemic, a group of young individuals falls ill, 
and get tested HIV positive. This group knows they contracted the virus and that they will 
                                                 
4 Note that Zhang et al. (2003) found a similar result based on a different model, i.e. that increases in longevity 
have a non-monotonic effect on savings. In particular, starting at high mortality a mortality decline will first 
increase and later on decrease savings. 4 
not survive the first period. Being diagnosed HIV positive, they face a rise in expenditures on 
medical treatment
5 without having been able to save in advance for these costs. Because this 
group will not save for future consumption, a decrease in aggregate savings characterizes this 
second stage. In the third stage, the population becomes aware of the future risk they face of 
contracting the virus and will save for a possible future fall of income and increase in 
expenditures. In this stage, the number of young individuals with a positive HIV status is still 
small. Therefore, the increase in savings of the other non-infected part of the population 
exceeds the decrease in savings of the HIV contaminated group. However, if the infection 
rate increases further, i.e. if many young individuals get infected, the decrease in savings by 
these diagnosed HIV infected individuals will exceed the increase in savings of the group that 
faces the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS later in life and aggregate savings will fall again. 
 
A second focus of the paper is the effect of individual diagnostic testing for HIV/AIDS. It is 
estimated that only 10 percent of the HIV-infected people are also aware of their status. 
Increasing status knowledge could therefore mitigate a further spread of HIV. Apart from, 
the effect on the HIV prevalence rate, testing can have important direct effects on individuals’ 
welfare, which is crucial for decision making on the intensity of HIV-testing. In this paper, we 
analyze these direct welfare effects of diagnostic HIV tests. We assume that individuals who 
are infected by the virus will derive less utility from the consumption of regular goods and 
derive more utility from the consumption of medical treatment than non-infected individuals. 
Furthermore, we assume that being diagnosed HIV positive is necessary for getting the 
appropriate medical consumption.  
 
Individuals can be tested in both periods of their life. Testing in period 1 obviously resolves 
the uncertainty in period 1, but not in period 2. We assume that testing only takes place at the 
start of each period. If the test result turns out to be positive, individuals are receiving a 
negative utility shock caused by a “fear-of-death” or “stigmatization” parameter. On the other 
hand, these individuals are better able to attain optimal (medical) consumption. On top of 
that, the individuals who receive a positive test in the first period of their life do not have to 
save for an uncertain chance of survival. Surprisingly, testing individuals who turn out to be 
HIV negative does not necessarily imply a positive welfare effect for these individuals. The 
reason is that although individuals that are untested, will save less in the first period, are still 
                                                 
5 Medical costs are a significant part of HIV affected households’ expenditures. Steinberg et al. (2002), for 
instance, finds that affected households in South Africa on average spend 34% on medical treatment.  
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able to consume more in the second period of their lives. The latter is due to an (informal) 
“longevity” insurance system that we postulate for untested individuals, which redistributes 
savings from the diseased due to HIV/AIDS to the not-infected survivors. The positive 
effects of this redistributive insurance system have to be weighed against the negative utility 
effects of sub-optimal consumption choices if individuals are uncertain on being HIV 
infected or not. 
 
Diagnostic HIV testing during the second period of individuals’ life has, however, less 
ambiguous welfare effects. A higher frequency of testing during old age makes it more likely 
that an individual will be able to get the right medical consumption if he contracted the virus. 
This prospect makes it attractive to save more in order to be better prepared for possible 
higher medical consumption in the future. Due to more frequent future testing these savings 
have become more efficient in terms of individual utility, and so young individuals’ expected 
lifetime utility will rise.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the basic 
set up of the model. In Section 3, we derive the course of savings over the four distinguished 
stages of the epidemic. In Section 4, we evaluate the marginal effects of diagnostic testing for 
HIV status knowledge on social welfare and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Model 
This section describes the model assumptions and briefly defines the four stages of the 
epidemic. We first present a broad outline of the model and then turn to specification issues. 
 
2.1. Outline of the model 
We consider a country where a large group of agents of the same age (their number 
normalized to one) optimizes consumption over two periods. In each period, agents face a 
certain probability,  , ( 1 , 2)
act
t t α = , of contracting HIV, which might be different from their 
perceived  probability of contracting the virus, αt. We assume that the perceived HIV 
contamination “risk” in each period,  t α , and the probability of knowing one’s status in that 6 
period,  t β , is equal for all agents
6. Agents die at the end of the period in which they get 
infected. We distinguish four different stages in the evolution of the epidemic. 
 
Stage 0 
This is the benchmark case, in which HIV does not exist. Individuals optimize a simple 
logarithmic lifetime utility function containing regular and medical consumption. They save to 
smooth consumption over their lifetime.  
 
Stage 1 
In this stage, HIV starts to spread but the virus is yet unknown and therefore HIV testing 
cannot take place. A small part of the young population,  1 0
act α > , is infected without this 
being perceived by the population, i.e.  0 1 = α . In this initial phase of the disease, agents are 
not aware of their infection, and so they keep on behaving as in stage 0. Individual saving 
behavior is therefore not influenced, but after the first period of life, the savings of the 




In stage 2, HIV is diagnosed for the first time. Although the prevalence rate 
act
1 α  is still very 
small, the population has become aware of the contamination risk that they face, although not 
fully. In particular, agents underestimate the probability of contracting HIV and assume that 
the probability of infection when old is negligible, i.e.  0 2 1 1 ≈ > > α α α
act . Infected agents 
learn about their status only after a diagnostic HIV test. Starting in this phase, testing takes 
place: a fraction  1 β  of all young individuals is randomly selected to be tested. As a result, a 
fraction  1
act βα  of the young individuals will become aware of its positive status. On the other 
hand, a fraction  11 (1 )
act β α −  receives a negative test and is thus certain to reach the second 
period.
7 In this phase of the disease, where HIV becomes visible in society, individual savings 
are negatively affected in the following two ways. First, the fraction 
act
1 1α β of young 
individuals who know they are infected will no longer save. Second, those young agents who 
                                                 
6 We also assume that  ,,,  a n d   121 2 α αβ β  are independent. Although these are strong assumptions, we choose 
to keep the model as simple as possible. 
7  For simplicity, we abstract from other sources of mortality in the first period of life.   
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are  not tested perceive to have a lower life expectancy as they now expect to have a lower 
probability (i.e.  1 1 α −  instead of 1) of reaching the second period. As a result, their savings 
will decrease.  
 
Stage 3 and 4 
In this stage, HIV develops into a serious epidemic. Agents who have been tested negative or 
who have not been tested at all in the first period, take account of the higher probability of 
being infected in the second period, i.e.  2 0 α > . In particular, if agents in the second period 
get a positive test result, they will want to buy more medical consumption to fight the 
consequences of the disease. Therefore, the higher-perceived value of  2 α  will engender 
higher savings by the agents in this group. On the other hand, as the group of positive-tested 
individuals in the first period increases as well due to the spread of the disease, the group who 
does not save at all increases in size. In stage 3, the former effect on savings dominates the 
latter effect, i.e. aggregate savings increase. Stage 4 is defined by the property that the effect of 
the decrease in savings of the HIV positive agents in period 1 dominates the effect of the 
increase in savings by the individuals who have a chance of reaching the second period. We 
also assume that in phases 3 and 4 perceived and actual contamination rates converge, i.e. 
11
act α α →  and   22 α α →
act . 
 
2.2. Specification of the model  
Expected utility of a young individual who lives in a phase j of the epidemic depends on 
whether he is tested or not, and if tested, on the outcome of the test. The utility of an 
individual tested HIV positive is:  
  11 1 1 1 1 (, ) l n l n ξμ = ++
jj j j j
ii ucm c m z  (1) 
    
where  c ( m) represents regular (medical) consumption with prices equal to 1 and  m p  
respectively.  ξ  and μ  are preference parameters for respectively regular and medical 
consumption. The suffix to this parameter indicates that the utility of both regular and 
medical consumption depends on the health position of the individual. In particular, if the 
individual is HIV infected, indicated by i, he derives less utility from regular consumption 
than if he is healthy, indicated by h, but more utility from medical consumption, i.e.  i h ξ ξ >  
and  hi μ μ < . Consequently, if agents get a positive test, they will substitute medical 8 
consumption for regular consumption. A negative constant z1 is added to indicate that the 
positive-tested individual suffers from knowing to die prematurely and/or being stigmatized. 
Expected utility of a negative-tested individual is: 
 
  12 1 2 1 1 22 2 (,, , ) l n l n (, )
j j jjj j j j jj
hh uccmm c m ucm ξμ δ =+ +  (2) 
 
where  0 δ >  is the discount factor and  22 2 (, )
jj j ucm stands for the expected second-period 
utility. Untested agents can be HIV-positive nevertheless. However, we implicitly assume that 
these agents do not have access to the kind of medical consumption that is suited for HIV 
patients. So, even if untested agents learn to have been infected in a period, they will not be 
able to consume more medical consumption. We plug this assumption into the model by 
assuming that a not-tested but infected individual has to take ex ante  h μ  as the relevant 
parameter in the utility function, although ex post  i μ  determines the realized utility. The 
expected utility of untested individuals in period 1 is specified in Equation (3). 
 
 
12 1 2 1 1 1 1 22 2
22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
22 2
(,, , ) l n l n ( 1 ) (, )
 ( , ) ( ln ln ) (1 )( ln ln )
(1 )( ln ln )
j j jjj j j j jj
h




uccmm c m ucm
ucm c m z c m
cm
ξμ α δ
α β ξμ α β ξμ
αξ μ
=+ + −




where  (1 ) tt i t h ξ αξ α ξ ≡+ − . We assume that individuals who are untested in the first period 
take part in a mutual insurance system in which the savings of those who decease in the 
period are distributed among the untested survivors.   
 
Agents only earn an income w in the first period and earn interest rate r on their savings. 
Given this and the specified utility function we can derive individual and aggregate savings for 
all distinguished stages of the spread of the virus. 
 
3. The evolution of savings  
Stage 0:  0; 0, 1,2
act
jj jj αα β == = = 









 (4)  
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where aggregate savings, 
0 S , equals individual savings, 
0 s , as the size of a generation has 
been normalized to one.  
 
Stage I:  11 22 0; 0; 0, 1,  2
act act
j j αα αα β >= == = =  
HIV unexpectedly shows up. However, as the disease cannot be diagnosed yet, saving 
behavior does not change, the only difference with phase 0 being that the total savings of the 
deceased, i.e., 
I acts 1 α , will be distributed among the  1 (1 )
act α − survivors.  
 
Stage II:  11 2 1 2 0; 0; 0
act αα α β β >>≈ > =  
In this period, HIV tests for young individuals become available, and a percentage  1 β  of 
young individuals will be tested. Three different groups become relevant for saving behavior. 
First, a fraction 
act
1 1α β  of agents, to be indicated by group G1 in the sequel, who have been 
tested positive, will not save, as in they will not enter the second period. Second, 
11 (1 )







= . Third, the  1 1 β −  untested agents, indicated as groups G3 and G4, perceive 
to have a chance of  1 1 α −  of reaching the second period. Groups G3 and G4 consist of 
agents that, respectively, do carry and do not carry the virus, but are not tested as being HIV 
positive or negative. Only ex post, the untested individuals can be identified as belonging to 
groups G3 or G4. Consequently, they have equal ex ante optimal savings. Maximizing 























(1 ) (1 )
11 ( 1 )









As can be readily seen from Equation 2 and 3, it holds that 
0 II SS < . 
 10 
Stage III:  11 2 0, 0, 1,  2
act
j j αα α β ≥≥> > =  
This third phase distinguishes itself from stage II by the fact that young individuals have 
become aware of the HIV contamination risk they face in both periods of their life. Individuals 
know that in period 2 they can be tested with a probability  2 β  and they understand that a 
positive HIV status brings along a decline in utility of regular consumption and that medical 
treatment improves the way of life. This will affect savings of the distinguished groups.  
 
The young agents that are tested HIV positive (group G1), behave the same as in stage 2 and 
will thus not save. The agents in group G2, who are sure to reach the second period, and the 
untested agents in group G3 and G4, who perceive to have a probability of  1 1 α −  of reaching 
the second period, do change their saving behavior. Since they are now aware of the 
possibility to get positively tested in the second period of their life, they will save more to be 
able to better cope with the consequences of HIV infection. These ‘HIV anticipatory saving’ 
will initially be larger than the decrease in savings due to the risk of not reaching the second 
period.  
 
For the  11 (1 )
act β α − agents who have been tested negative in the first period (group G2), 
savings equal: 










where  ) ( ) ( 2 2 2 h i h i h h μ μ α β ξ ξ α μ ξ χ − + − + + ≡ . Comparing the savings of group G2 in 
stage II and stage III, it can easily be seen that savings is higher in stage III, i.e. 
(2 ) (2 )
III II sG sG >  if and only if the following condition holds 
 
  2() 0 ih i h ξ ξβ μμ − +− >  (8) 
 
Condition (8) implies that the relative decrease in utility of regular consumption when HIV 
infected is smaller than the relative increase in utility of medical consumption weighted for 
the fact that individuals can also make use of medical consumption. Thus, in a well 
established epidemic savings of HIV negative tested individuals (G2) are enhanced, whenever 
medical consumption is relatively important compared to regular consumption in case tested  
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HIV positive, under the condition that testing in the second period takes place at a certain 
level. In the further analyses, we assume that this condition holds. 
 
Untested agents in the first period (group G3 and G4), save for the second period even 


















Comparing  ) 4 ; 3 ( G G s
III  with  ) 4 ; 3 ( G G s
II  shows that this phase will generate more savings 
for groups G3 and G4 than stage 2. Consequently, aggregate savings in stage III, specified in 
Equation (10) is higher than in stage II. 
 
  11 1 (1 ) ( 2) (1 ) ( 3; 4)
III act III III Ss G s G G βα β =− + −  (10) 
 
Aggregate savings in stage III may even rise to a level higher than in the situation without 
HIV, i.e.  .
0 S S
III >  Whether this inequality actually holds depends on the parameters of the 
model, the degree of testing in the first period,  1 β , being one of the critical parameters. In 
general, for any given probability of first-period testing, i.e.,  1 01 β ≤ ≤ , 
0 S S
III >  will hold if 
21 () f α β ≥ . If testing increases, the number of agents who know for sure not to survive the 
first period will increase for a given first-period mortality rate. So, the best condition for an 
increase in savings above the benchmark level is when  1 0 β = . The worst condition seems to 
be the case with  1 1 β = , where all young individuals know their HIV status. To get an idea 
when savings will increase we consider both cases in turn. If  1 0 β =  it is straightforward to 
derive that 
0 S S


















Obviously, condition (11) can only hold if the perceived mortality rate in the first period  1 α is 
small enough.  
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The other extreme case is where  1 1 β = , i.e. where complete testing takes place in the first 
period. This takes away all uncertainty on the probability of dying in the first period, and only 
those who are sure to survive the first period will keep on saving. In this case, savings will 






















According to Equations (11) and (12) savings rise to a level above the benchmark level if the 
perceived and actual first-period mortality rate is small enough, compared to the second-
period contamination rate. This makes intuitively sense as the spread of the virus among 
young individuals decreases their savings, while the expected spread of the virus among old 
individuals increases savings. So, for a given testing rate  1 β  and with a relatively small-
perceived infection rate  1 α compared to  2 α , aggregate savings may increase.  
 
Stage IV 
If the actual number of HIV-infected individuals,  1
act α , keeps rising, the number of individuals 
in group G2 will decline. Although individua l  s a v i n g s  w i l l  r e m a i n  u n c h a n g e d ,  t h e  g r o u p  
composition changes, in this case implying that aggregate savings will eventually decrease. 
Moreover, notice from Equation (9) that with an increase in the perceived contamination rate 
when young, i.e.  1 α , individual savings of untested individuals will decrease as well. In fact, if 
both  1 α and  2 α  increase by the same proportion, then it is easy to see from Equation (9) that 
the savings-decreasing effect of the current rate  1 α  will eventually dominate the savings-
increasing effect. In stage IV, prevalence rates are at such levels that the savings-decrease 
effect dominates. 
 
Figure 2 gives an example of a development of savings over the evolution of HIV/AIDS
8. 
The solid line represents the four different phases of the epidemic as specified by the model 
                                                 
8 In drawing Figure 2, we have assumed that populations gradually become aware of the HIV contamination risk 
they face. Agents first underestimate the actual HIV contamination risk, but when the disease spreads, actual and 
perceived HIV contamination risks converge. For the calculations in Figure 2 we assumed this convergence 
process over time to be specified by  11 1 () () ( 1 ) ( 1 )
act tt t αλ α λ α = +− −. For 




above. The horizontal part of the line shows the situation without HIV/AIDS, where agents 
save a certain amount for future consumption (stage 0). Then stage I arrives where the disease 
overtakes some agents. Because the disease is still unknown, these infected agents are 
however not aware of their infection. As a result, they unexpectedly die premature, making it 
impossible for them to optimally use their lifetime resources. Their redundant or unused 
savings for the second period are transferred to the survivors. In stage II, testing makes it 
possible for HIV infected agents to know they will not survive the first period. This enables 
them to optimize lifetime utility by spending all income in the first period. The fall in 
aggregate savings represents the decline in savings of this particular group of agents. Next, a 
phase sets in where agents become (gradually) aware of the pervasiveness of the possibility of 
infection over their whole life. As a result, those who have a chance of surviving the first 
period will save more to take account of the additional costs in case of being contaminated by 
the virus in the second period of their life. In this phase, the savings-decreasing effect of 
higher young-age mortality (i.e. an increase in actual,  1
act α , and expected mortality,  1 α  is 
counteracted by the savings-increasing effect of higher expected old-age mortality,  2 α , so that 





Figure 2: The different phases of aggregate 
savings due to the spread of HIV 
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In the figure, this occurs for values of  1 0.12 0.24
act α ≤≤ . If the spread of HIV continues and 
manifests itself via an increase of the prevalence rates in both periods, the savings-decreasing 
effect of young-age mortality will be dominant and savings start to decrease. In Figure 2, the 
decline of savings sets in after the HIV prevalence rate reaches the value of 24%. 
 
4. The social-welfare effects of testing for HIV 
One of the important policy decisions in countries affected by HIV is the frequency of 
testing, in our model indicated by  1 β  for young and by  2 β  for old agents, respectively. The 
question we want to address here is whether intensifying testing directly increases social 
welfare. That is, we abstract from the (possible) long-run effect of testing on the HIV 
prevalence rate and analyze the effect of HIV testing on social welfare, using ex post individual 
utility as the relevant criterion.  
 
We assume that implementing a test does not involve any cost. Testing when young resolves 
the uncertainty on the true values of the parameters in the utility function, making it possible 
to purchase the utility-maximizing ratio of regular and medical consumption. When tested 
positive, individuals will no longer have to save for an uncertain future, as they know for sure 
to die young, i.e. before the second period. However, if the utility function contains a ‘fear-of-
dying’ or ‘stigma’ parameter, agents experience a negative utility shock if they are actually 
diagnosed HIV positive and realize that they will die prematurely. On the other hand, if 
individuals get a negative test result they will save more, as they will reach the second period 
with certainty. These individuals however, can no longer take part in the longevity insurance 
scheme, which means that, after surviving the first period, they will no longer get a transfer 
payment from their deceased contemporaries. 
 
Increasing the frequency of testing during older age does not take away the uncertainty of 
later infection at the time when the saving decision is made. It does increase, however, the 
probability that an individual can consume the right amount of medical consumption when he 
turns out to be infected later in life. The prospect of utility maximizing consumption later in 
life incites individuals to save more. In this case, this appears to be welfare increasing.  
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4.1. Testing young individuals 
We use ex post individual utility as the criterion to evaluate the effects of testing on social 
welfare. Individuals make their saving decisions at the beginning of the first period of life, 
however. Social welfare is then defined by: 
 
  12 11 1 1 1 1 ( , ) [ ( 1) (1 ) ( 2)] (1 )[ ( 3) (1 ) ( 4)]
act act act act WU G U GU G U G ββ βα α β α α =+ − + − + − (13) 
 
In Equation (13),  () , (1 , . . , 4 ) UG i i =  indicates ex post utility of young agents distinguished by 
both their HIV status and their test status in the first period. In particular, as noted before, 
the groups  1 G  and  2 G  are composed of the individuals who have been tested HIV positive 
and negative, respectively. The groups  3 G  and  4 G  consist of the individuals who have not 
been tested in the first period. In the first period, they may turn out be HIV infected,  3 G , or 
to be healthy,  4 G . The marginal effect of first-period testing on social welfare obviously 
depends on the utility difference between tested and untested individuals, as specified in 
Equation (14): 
 





(1 ) (3 ) ( 1 ) (2 ) (4 )
act act W









It is straightforward to derive that for those infected with HIV the utility difference 









(1 ) (3 )( ) l n  



















+ ++ + ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦
 (15) 
  
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (15) is the utility gain from lower savings. 
The term in brackets represents the utility gain due to consuming the optimal proportion of 
regular and medical consumption. The last term is the “stigma” parameter. Obviously, for the 
agents with a positive HIV-status testing is only utility improving, i.e.  (1 ) (3 ) 0 , UG UG −>  if 
the “stigma” parameter is small enough. In that case, the utility improving effects of getting 
the appropriate medical consumption and the prevention of too high savings dominate the 
stigma effect. 16 
 
Being tested negative in the first period resolves the uncertainty in this period, but not in the 
second. Again, the utility improving effect of the revelation of their status is that they are able 
to purchase the optimal ratio of regular and medical consumption goods (the term in brackets 
in Equation (16)). On the other hand, if their status is revealed, they can no longer take part 
in the insurance system that insures them against longevity risk. As a result, the return on 






(2 ) (4 )( ) l n
(3 ;4 )
(2 )






















+ +− + +
⎡⎤ +
++ ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦
 (16) 
 
where  ) 4 (G s  represents the savings of individuals from group  , 4 G including the transfer 













The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (16) is negative due to the fact that savings 
will be higher if the individuals know for sure to reach the second period, i.e. 
(2 ) (3 ;4 ) sG sG G > . The next term represents the effect on disposable income in the second 
period, in case the individual is infected or not infected, respectively. Strikingly, although 
untested individuals save less than individuals tested HIV negative, if they survive, their 
disposable income in the second period is higher, i.e.  (4 ) (2 ) sG sG > . This is due to the 
transfers they receive from the group of deceased individuals,  3 G .  
 
In both periods, individuals tested HIV negative thus appear to have a lower disposable 
income compared to individuals who turn out to be HIV negative without having been tested. 
Obviously the last term, representing the utility effect of getting the ‘right’ consumption ratio 
when tested HIV negative, is positive again. So, for the group if HIV-negative individuals, 
testing generates a positive ex post welfare effect if this consumption-ratio effect is larger than 
the disposable income effect.  
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Notice that when the virus is not widespread yet, i.e. when  1
act α is small, more testing might 
turn out to produce a negative welfare effect, due to the decrease in disposable income of 
tested individuals. If the virus spreads, the first utility difference in Equation (16) will become 
relatively more important and the welfare characteristic of testing then depends largely on the 
relative strength of the fear-of-dying parameter. 
 
4.2. Testing old individuals 
Consider now a change of testing frequency in period 2. Changing the frequency of testing 
will incite all individuals who were tested HIV negative in the first period, or who were not 
tested at all, to increase their savings. For these groups the increase in savings is motivated by 
the expected increase in medical consumption when tested HIV positive in the second period 
of life. A second effect of future testing is the increased probability of being able to consume 
the right proportion of regular and medical consumption. Notice, however, that ex post group 
3 G  will not enjoy this positive effect of testing because they die prematurely. For group  2 G  
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where the terms in brackets are again the utility effects of being able to get the right 
consumption ratios after having received a positive or a negative test, respectively. Obviously, 
these terms are positive. The first term indicates the effect of the additional savings on utility 
for group  2 G . It can be derived that  2 (2 ) / 0 SG β ∂ ∂>  under the assumption that medical 
consumption generates higher utility if individuals are HIV infected, i.e.,  0 ih μ μ −>  Given 
this result, we can infer from the first term on the right-hand side of Equation (17) that the 
additional savings engendered by a higher testing frequency  2 β  leads to a gain in ex-post 
utility. Apparently, by saving more and having more income disposable for financing the 
higher expected medical consumption individual’ utility increase. The only negative effect is 
then the negative utility shock  22 z α δ −  produced by the information of being infected, i.e., 18 
the stigmatization effect. Equation (18) specifies the ex-post social-welfare effects of a change 














(( 1 ) )
() ( 1 ) () (3 ;4 )
  
(1 )
                   
   ln ln ( )ln















ξμα ξμ α ξμ
ξμ α χ β
ξμ ξ μ
δα ξ μ ξ μ
ξμ ξ μ
ξξ μ





⎡⎤ ++ + − + ∂
−+ + ⎢⎥ +− ∂ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ +
++ + + ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦
⎡ +







Maybe not surprisingly the effects that can be distinguished are qualitatively the same as with 
group  2 G , i.e. a savings effect (the first term), a consumption effect (the second and third 
term) and a direct negative utility shock (the last term). It is fairly easy to prove that the effect 
of higher savings on utility is again positive. Moreover, the two terms in Equation (18)
representing the effect of being more able to purchase the correct consumption ratio 
represent a positive effect as well. So, also for this group testing implies for this group a trade-
off between the ‘stigmatization’ and the opportunity of consuming more according to their 
medical condition.  
 
Finally, also untested individuals do not survive the first period, i.e., group  3 G , will save more 
if the frequency of future testing increases. However, they will not experience the higher 
utility of consumption in the second period. Their increased savings fall due to the surviving 
members of the untested group, i.e., group  . 4 G  Therefore, intensifying testing will ex post 
have a negative effect on utility for group  3 G . Notice, however, that this group diminishes in 
size if the frequency of testing in the first period rises.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper employed a two-period lifetime optimization model to explain savings by a four-
stage non-monotonic process partly supporting Bonnel’s (2000) conjecture that the 
HIV/AIDS affects savings differently in the various stages of the epidemic. We in particular 
considered two issues: First, how aggregate private household savings react to changes in  
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HIV incidence in the specified four phases of the epidemic. Second, we analyzed the social-
welfare effects of diagnostic testing for HIV. The period of life in which HIV strikes, appears 
to be an important determinant for both issues.  
 
Regarding savings, if individuals perceive that HIV might predominantly affect them at young 
age, they will lower savings for old age as the expected lifetime is shortened. However, if 
individuals start taking account of the fact that HIV might also strike them at an older age, 
they will start to take more precautions in the sense that they save more in order to be able to 
purchase the appropriate medical treatment later in life. If the HIV contamination rate among 
the young is not too large, the ‘HIV anticipatory saving effect’ will be the dominant force, and 
lead to an increase in aggregate savings. Aggregate savings might even temporarily rise to a 
level that is above the benchmark case level without HIV. If this occurs, the general-
equilibrium effects described by Young (2005), leading to higher wages and higher welfare for 
future generations can be strengthened although for this case of rising savings to occur, the 
mortality rate among the young should be limited. If the spread of HIV among the young 
aged intensifies, the effect of decreasing old-age savings takes over again and annihilates the 
HIV anticipatory saving effect in the end. Then the ‘gift of the dying’ (in the words of Young, 
2005) no longer consists of a larger capital stock associated with higher savings, but an 
increasing scarcity of labor.  
 
Regarding the welfare effects of intensifying HIV testing, the results again largely depend on 
whether testing takes place when individuals are young or old. When individuals are young, 
testing resolves (at least partly) the uncertainty on surviving the first period of life. For those 
individuals tested positive, this implies that there is no longer a need to save for old-age 
consumption. These individuals are instead able to focus on getting the right medical 
treatment and thus merely reallocate their disposable income from non-medical to medical 
consumption. This is obviously utility enhancing whenever the disutility of knowing to die 
prematurely is relatively low. For HIV negative individuals, the effects of a higher testing 
frequency are not that clear cut. When tested negative, they can benefit from consuming the 
correct mix of regular and medical consumption in the first period. However, total 
consumption in this period will be lower as they know for sure to survive the first period and 
therefore save more for old age. Moreover, the total return on their savings, and therefore 
their old-age income, is lower than for untested individuals, because they cannot participate in 
the insurance scheme. The story is different, however, when the frequency of testing during 20 
old age is at stake. In that case, for all survivors to the second period the uncertainty on their 
HIV status in the second period will be diminished. As a result, higher savings are now more 
‘efficient’ in the sense that these higher savings can be allocated to the optimal mix of medical 
and regular consumption with a larger probability.  
 
In conclusion, there is a striking analogy between the effects of HIV on savings and the 
welfare effects of testing for HIV. In both cases, the effects are negative during young age: 
HIV decreases savings and testing does not necessarily increase welfare, as tested individuals 
cannot share in the ‘gift of the dying’ through a longevity insurance scheme. If individuals 
perceive a higher probability of HIV contraction later in life, savings may increase and the 
savings will rise even more if the frequency of testing during old age increases. The higher 
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Annex 
Table 1: Statistical model of the change in domestic saving rate 
   Period: 1990-1996 
(Bonnel (2000)) 
 Period: 1997-2004 
  Estimate t-statistics Estimate t-statistics
Constant 0.46  0.1  -3.13  -0.64 
Gross domestic savings (1990)  -0.28
** -2.8 -0.11
* -1.57 
Secondary enrolment rate (1990)  -0.10
**  -2.0 -0.02  -0.48 
Growth rate of GDP per capita (1980-90)  86.60
** 2.4  161.53
*** 4.85 
Log of number of phones (1994)  2.49
*  1.8 0.68  0.55 
Log of HIV prevalence rate (1997)  -1.18  -1.5  0.41  0.51 
Log of HIV prevalence rate squared  -0.61
**  -2.6 0.20 0.57 
Dummy variable for Southern Africa  10.20
**  2.2 1.07  0.24 
Dependent Variable: change in domestic savings rate 
 